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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
TIMES MIRROR CO. v. UNITED STATES: 
MEDIA'S REQUEST FOR PUBLIC 
ACCESS TO PRE-INDICTMENT SEARCH 
WARRANT MATERIALS DENIED 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Times Mirror Co. v. United States of America, l the 
Ninth Circuit held that the first amendment does not give the 
public a qualified right of access to pre-indictment search war-
rant materials during an ongoing criminal investigation.2 Addi-
tionally, the court declined to find a right of access to pre-indict-
ment search warrant materials under the common laws or 
section 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.· The 
issue of whether the public has a constitutional right of access to 
warrant materials before an indictment has been handed down 
was a matter of first impression in the Ninth Circuit. II In a previ-
ous Ninth Circuit decision, the court held that trial courts have 
the power to seal search warrants and related materials within 
constitutional limits.s However, the boundaries of those limits 
1. 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied (per Norris, J.; the other panel memo 
bers were Schroeder, J. and Alarcon, J.). 
2. [d. The court's holding was narrow. It did not consider whether the public had a 
right of access to search warrant materials after an indictment had been returned or 
after an investigation had been completed. [d. at 1221. 
3. [d. at 1219·20. The appellants argued that even if no first amendment right of 
access existed, there was a common law right to inspect and copy public records and 
documents. [d. at 1219. 
4. [d. at 1221. Rule 4I(g) provides: "The federal' magistrate before whom the war· 
rant is returned shall attach to the warrant a copy of the return, inventory and all other 
papers in connection therewith and shall file them with the clerk of the district court for 
the district in which the property was seized." 
5. Times at 1212 n.3. 
6. See Matter of Sealed Affidavit(s) to Search Warrants, 600 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 
129 
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had not been previously defined.7 
II. FACTS 
In June of 1988, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") 
conducted a nationwide investigation into allegations of fraud 
and bribery in the defense contracting industry.s As part of the 
investigation, the FBI obtained search warrants from magis-
trates in the United States District Court for the Central and 
Southern Districts of California.9 After the warrants were issued 
and executed, the FBI prepared an inventory of the items 
seized 10 and filed the list, along with the search warrants and 
supporting affidavits, with the clerk of the court in each 
district. 11 
At the government's request, the magistrate in each district 
ordered that the warrants and supporting documents be main-
tained under indefinite seal.12 The Times Mirror Company, 
KCST -TV Channel 39, and The Copley Press, Inc. [hereinafter 
"the media"] petitioned the district courts for an order un-
sealing the warrant materials. 13 
In the central district, the magistrate ordered the docu-
ments unsealed.14 However, the government secured a stay and 
appealed. 1I1 On appeal, the district court reversed the magis-
trate's order on grounds that the public's access rights did not 
outweigh the public's interest in an unfettered criminal 
1979) (trial court improperly concluded that federal courts lacked authority to seal docu-
ments; case remanded for consideration of whether sealing was appropriate). 
7. Times at 1212 n. 3. 
8. [d. at 1211. 
9. [d. This investigation originated in the Eastern District of Virginia and was 
known as "Operation Ill-Wind." [d. The investigation involved the issuance and execu-
tion of more than 40 search warrants across the United States. See In Re Search War-
rant for Secretarial Area-Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 570 (8th Cir. 1988) (media request for 
access to search warrant materials denied). 
10. Times, 873 F.2d at 1211. 
11. [d. 
12. [d. 
13. Times, 873 F.2d at 1211-12. Two separate original actions were filed by the me-
dia in the United States District Courts for the Central and Southern Districts of Cali-
fornia requesting access to the warrant materials which were filed with the court clerk in 
each district. [d. 
14. [d. 
15. [d. 
2
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investigation. IS 
In the southern district, the magistrate denied the motion 
to unseal the documents.17 The media appealed18 and the dis-
trict court affirmed. IS The southern district court ruled that 
there was no first amendment right of access to pre-indictment 
warrant materials and the government's interest in maintaining 
secrecy during a criminal investigation was more important than 
the common law right of access.20 The media next appealed the 
district courts' decisions21 denying access and the cases were 
consolidated for purposes of the Times appea1.22 
16. [d. In the central district, Judge David V. Kenyon reviewed Magistrate 
Reichmann's ruling ordering unsealing of the search warrant affidavits and determined 
that the government had shown that the ruling was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 
Judge Kenyon found that the government had established the necessity of keeping the 
documents sealed. Specifically, the investigation was at an early stage and there were 
very real concerns over the possible destruction of evidence or alteration of testimony. 
More importantly, unsealing the affidavits would divulge the scope of the investigation 
and the names of persons who may be involved. The Judge cautioned that the need for 
continued secrecy would decrease with the passage of time and at that point the press 
must "be able to perform its vital function of informing the public, thus helping to en-
sure the legitimacy of governmental proceedings." In Re Sealed Search Warrants for 
Premises of Teledyne Electronics, Litton Data Systems, Northrop and Fred Lackner, 
United States Dist. Ct. (C.D. Cal.) Misc. Nos. 21-676 and 21-679. 
17. Times, 873 F.2d at 1212. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. In the district court proceeding, Chief Judge Gordon Thompson reviewed 
Magistrate Gonzalez's decision denying access. Magistrate Gonzalez's order stated 1) 
that the first amendment right of access to judicial proceedings applies if the proceedings 
and documents have historically been open to the public and if public access would play 
a positive role in the functioning of the proceeding; 2) that search warrant proceedings 
are not, as a rule, open to the public; 3) that law enforcement officers must obtain search 
warrants from neutral, detached magistrates and any suppression of evidence obtained 
through illegal searches operates as a check on governmental overreaching; and 4) public 
access to search warrant proceedings would not add appreciably to the functioning of 
that process. Magistrate Gonzalez concluded that although the public has a common law 
right of access to search warrants and related documents, the government had demon-
strated a need for maintaining secrecy during its investigation and the government's 
need for confidentiality outweighed the public's need for access to the materials. Chief 
Judge Thompson found that the magistrate had appropriately balanced the competing 
interests and that her decision that the search warrant materials should remain under 
seal was not erroneous nor contrary to law. In Re Sealed Search Warrant for Cubic Cor-
poration, United States Dist. Ct. (S.D. Cal.) Mag. No. 88-2945 (M) at 2-4. 
20. Times at 1212. "The Supreme Court has recognized that the public has a right, 
founded in the common law, 'to inspect and copy public records and documents, includ-
ing judicial records and documents.''' [d. at 1218 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Communica-
tions, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) (emphasis added». 
21. Times, 873 F.2d at 1212. 
22. [d. at 1211. 
3
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III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE PRESS 
The first amendment guarantees freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press.23 On its face, the Constitution singles out 
the press for special status.2• However, in spite of what appears 
to be a distinct constitutional privilege, the United States Su-
preme Court has never granted the media special access rights 
superior to those of the general public.211 
1. Prior Restraints 
Tensions arise between first and sixth amendment rights 
when the defendant requests that a procedure be closed to avoid 
adverse pre-trial publicity.28 In cases which attract a great deal 
23. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. 
CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
24. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (re-
quiring newsmen to appear before state or federal grand juries and testify as to confiden-
tial information did not abridge the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the first 
amendment). In Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion, he asserted that "[tlhe press has a 
preferred position in our constitutional scheme ... to bring fulfillment to the public's 
right to know." [d. See also Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HAST. L.J. 631 (1975). "If the 
Free Press guarantee meant no more than freedom of expression, it would be a constitu-
tional redundancy." [d. at 633. 
25. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.s. 817 (1974) (media requested permission to inter-
view individual jail inmates). In Pell, the Court upheld a prison regulation which did not 
permit face-to-face interviews between the press or media and specifically named indi-
vidual prisoners. [d. at 835. The media asserted that the regulation was an unconstitu-
tional infringement on the freedom of the press guaranteed by the first and fourteenth 
amendments. [d. at 821. The court noted that the media's freedom to publish articles 
about the California prison system had not been impaired. [d. at 829. Additionally, the 
Constitution did "not ... accord the press special access to information not shared by 
members of the public generally." [d. at 834. See also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 
U.S. 843 (1974) (companion case to Pel/). The prison regulation contested by the media 
in Saxbe was essentially the same as the one in Pell, and the Court again concluded that 
the regulation did not abridge the first amendment freedom of the press because the 
press had exactly the same visitation rights as members of the general public. [d. at 850. 
26. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (trial judge's failure to pro-
tect defendant from inherently prejudicial pre-trial publicity and to insulate jurors from 
disruptive outside influences deprived defendant of the right to a fair trial); Estes v. 
Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 875 (1965) (televising and broadcast-
ing of defendant's trial was inherently prejudicial and deprived defendant of his due 
process rights); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (failure to transfer trial to a neutral 
4
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of public interest,27 the issue arises as to how far the trial judge 
may go in an effort to protect the defendant from the effects of 
adverse publicity.28 
In Nebraska Press Ass'n u. Stuart,29 the Supreme Court 
considered whether it was permissible for a trial judge to issue 
an order restraining the media from publishing or broadcasting 
confessions made by the accused to law enforcement officers.30 
The order was implemented to protect the defendant's right to a 
fair and impartial trial. 31 Although the Court declined to estab-
lish a priority as between first amendment and sixth amendment 
rights,32 the majority noted that any prior restraint on publica-
venue after learning that jurors had already formed an opinion as to the defendant's 
guilt was a denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment). 
See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (media restricted from 
publishing confessions or admissions made by the accused to law enforcement officers). 
In his opinion, Chief Justice Burger discussed the historical conflict between the right of 
the accused and the guarantees of freedom of the press. Id. at 547-49. 
Thomas Jefferson expressed the dilemma created by an unfettered press in a letter 
written from Paris concerning press attacks on an accused: 
In truth it is afflicting that a man who has past his life in serv-
ing the public ... should yet be liable to have his peace of 
mind so much disturbed by any individual who shall think 
proper to arraign him in a newspaper. It is however an evil for 
which there is no remedy. Our liberty depends on the freedom 
of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost. 
Id. at 548 (quoting 9 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 239 (J. Boyd ed. 1954)). 
27. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. 333 (defendant accused of bludgeoning his pregnant 
wife to death); Estes, 387 U.S. 532 (defendant allegedly involved in massive swindling 
scheme); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (defendant accused of bank robbery, 
kidnapping and murder); Irvin, 366 U.S. 717 (defendant arrested and tried for six 
murders). 
28. See Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979) (Constitution did not give 
the press or public a guarantee of access to pre-trial suppression hearings). In Gannett, 
the court noted that "a trial judge has an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the 
effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity." See infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text. 
29. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
30. Id. at 543. 
31. Id. Defendant was accused of sexual assault and mass murder and these crimes 
had attracted widespread media attention. Id. at 542. Defendant's attorney requested an 
order restricting publication of "matters that mayor may not be publicly reported or 
disclosed to the public" because prejudicial news would make it difficult to impanel an 
impartial jury. Id. The court found that there was a "clear and present danger that pre-
trial publicity could impinge upon the defendant's right to a fair trial." Id. at 543. The 
order prohibited reporting "(a) the existence and nature of any confessions or admissions 
made by the defendant to law enforcement officers, (b) any confessions or admissions 
made to any third parties, except members of the press, and (c) other facts 'strongly 
implicative' of the accused." Id. at 545. 
32. Id. at 561. The Court noted that the authors of the Bill of Rights knew that 
5
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tion bears a "heavy presumption" of unconstitutionality.33 After 
considering the entire record,34 the Court found that the pre-
sumption against the use of prior restraints was not overcome.311 
The Court held that unless there was a compelling need justify-
ing the prior restraint against publication36 and no other mea-
sures short of restraint37 would protect the defendant's right to a 
fair trial by an impartial jury, the press was free to report and 
comment on the judicial proceedings.38 
2. Right of Access. to Judicial Proceedings 
In Gannett v. DePasquale,39 the press claimed first amend-
ment and sixth amendment rights of access to a pre-trial sup-
pression hearing.40 The United States Supreme Court observed 
potential conflicts existed between the first and sixth amendments and failed to "resolve 
the issue by assigning to one priority over the other, .... " Id. 
33. Id. at 558. See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) 
(government sought to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from pub-
lishing classified information on the Viet Nam conflict); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 
(1931) (Minnesota statute enjoining publishers from producing "a malicious, scandalous 
and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical" held unconstitutional). 
34. Id. at 562. In order to determine if the order restraining publication was justi-
fied, the Court applied the test developed by Justice Learned Hand in United States v. 
Dennis, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The test is "[w)hether the gravity of the 'evil' discounted by 
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the dan-
ger." Id. at 510. In Nebraska, the record showed that the trial judge could have reasona-
bly concluded that the pervasive publicity would impair defendant's right to a fair trial. 
Nebraska, 427 U.S. at 562-63. However, these conclusions were speculative. Id. Also, the 
record failed to show that alternatives to prior restraint would have been ineffective. Id. 
at 563. Further, the effectiveness of prior restraints in deterring prejudicial publicity was 
questionable. Id. at 566-67. The court stated that "[r)easonable minds can have few 
doubts about the gravity of the evil pretrial publicity can work, but the probability that 
it would do so here was not demonstrated with the degree of certainty our cases on prior 
restraint require." Id. at 569. 
35. Id. at 570. 
36. Id. at 562-63. In Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Nebraska, he noted 
that prior restraints on publication would be tolerated in an "extremely narrow class of 
cases". Id. at 726. Specifically, prohibitions against publication may be permitted if Na-
tional security is threatened. Id. 
37. Nebraska, 427 U.S. at 563-64. Alternatives to prior restraint were discussed in 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). They include (a) change of trial venue; (b) 
postponement of trial until the threat of prejudicial publicity abates; (c) insulating wit-
nesses from the press; (d) extensive voir dire to screen out jurors with fixed opinions as 
to guilt or innocence; (e) clear instructions on the sworn duty of each juror; and (0 se-
questration of jurors, if necessary. Id. at 357-63. 
38. Nebraska, 427 U.S. at 570. 
39. 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
40. Id. at 369. 
6
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in its opinion that "the Constitution nowhere mentions any right 
of access to a criminal trial on the part of the public .... "41 The 
sixth amendment guarantees a speedy and public trial by an im-
partial jury"2 but these are rights which are personal to the 
accused.43 
3. Public Access to Trials 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia"" was the first case 
to consider whether the Constitution guarantees the public the 
right to attend an open criminal trial."!! The opinion discussed 
the history of public criminal trials at length,,,e the importance 
41. [d. at 379. The Court summarily dismissed the first amendment claim. [d. at 
391-92. The Court noted that the trial court's decision to close the hearing was based on 
two factors: First, the District Attorney was allowed to state his objection to closure and 
was granted an opportunity to be heard. [d. at 392. Second, the trial court balanced the 
public's right of access against the defendant's right to a fair trial and concluded that the 
press could be excluded from the suppression hearing because of the likelihood of preju-
dicial publicity. [d. at 392-93. Because the trial court properly balanced the competing 
interests and because the denial of access was only temporary, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the first amendment right of access to attend criminal trials was not vio-
lated. [d. at 393. 
42. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
43. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 379-80. The issue in Gannett was not whether the 
defendant could compel a private trial but whether the press or public have an indepen-
dent enforceable right to a public trial. [d. at 382-83 (emphasis added). The Court held 
that even if a common law right existed for the public to attend a criminal trial, there 
was no correlative common law right to attend a pre-trial hearing. [d. at 387. 
44. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
45. [d. at 563-64. Defendant's first conviction was reversed on appeal for admission 
of improper evidence; the second and third trials ended in mistrials. At the defendant's 
fourth trial on a murder charge, the judge ordered the press and the public excluded 
from the courtroom without first considering whether there was any justification for clo-
sure, whether alternatives to closure were available or whether the press or public had 
any constitutional right to attend the trial. [d. at 580-81. During the closed trial, at the 
conclusion of the Comm()nwealth's evidence, the court again declared a mistrial and 
found the accused not guilty of murder. [d. at 562. 
46. [d. at 564-69. In England, before the Norman conquest, cases were brought 
before local courts which were attended by the freemen of the community. [d. at 565. 
Since that time, although changes in procedure have occurred, "one thing remained con-
7
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of maintaining openness,47 and the guarantees of freedom of 
speech and of the press.48 The Court wrote: "People in an open 
society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it 
is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from ob-
serving. "49 The Court noted that the trial judge failed to state 
for the record reasons supporting closure, failed to consider any 
alternatives to closure, and failed to consider the constitutional 
right of the public and press to attend the trial. lIO The Court 
held that "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings, 
the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public. "111 
In Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court,1I2 the Court 
again confronted the issue of whether the press and public could 
be barred from a criminal trial. II3 Under a Massachusetts statute 
mandating closure, 1i4 the public and press were barred from the 
stant: the public character of the trial at which guilt or innocence was decided." Id. at 
566. This free access was also an attribute of the judicial system in colonial America. Id. 
at 564. "[H)istorical evidence demonstrates conclusively that ... criminal trials both 
here and in England [have) long been presumptively open." Id. at 569. 
47. Id. at 571-73. The Court observed that when a shocking crime occurs, the com-
munity reacts with outrage and public protest. Id. at 571. Thus, openness serves a "pro-
phylactic purpose" because it provides an outlet for community concern, hostility and 
emotion, and satisfies the public's need to see that justice is carried out effectively and 
without abuse. Id. 
48. Id. at 577-81. The State argued that there was no express constitutional guaran-
tee giving the public the right to attend criminal trials. Id. at 579. However, the Court 
held that the explicit first amendment guarantees would be meaningless if the right to 
attend criminal trials could be discretionarily withheld. Id. at 576-77. 
49. Id. at 572. 
50. Id. at 580-81. The Court recognized alternatives to closure which might be im-
plemented to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial, however, in Richmond the 
Court declined to list the circumstances which might justify the closure of all or part of a 
criminal trial. Id. at 581 n.18. The Court stated that the right to attend a criminal trial 
was not absolute and that a trial judge could impose reasonable time, place and manner 
restrictions on access to judicial proceedings as long as those restrictions did not seri-
ously infringe on first amendment rights. Id. 
51. Id. at 581. 
52. 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (Massachusetts statute barring press and the public from 
criminal trials during the testimony of a rape victim violated the first amendment). 
53. Id. at 598. 
54. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 278, section 16A (West 1981) provides in part: 
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, 
carnal abuse or other crime involving sex, where a minor 
under eighteen years of age is the person upon, with or against 
whom the crime is alleged to have been committed ... the 
presiding justice shall exclude the general public from the 
court room, admitting only such persons as may have a direct 
interest in the case. 
8
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courtroom during the testimony of a rape victim under the age 
of eighteen.1i1i 
The Court in Globe stressed the importance of access to 
criminal trials in order to protect first amendment rights.1i6 The 
Court found that the right of access to criminal trials deserved 
first amendment protection because criminal trials have histori-
cally been open to the press and publicli7 and access to criminal 
trials plays a significant role in the functioning of the judicial 
process. liS Having established that first amendment rights were 
implicated, the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard: The 
press and public cannot be barred from criminal trials unless the 
government can show that there is a compelling interest justify-
ing closureli9 and the order is narrowly tailored to effectuate that 
interest.6o 
55. Globe, 457 U.S. at 598. 
56. [d. at 603-04. In Globe, the Court conceded that the first amendment did not 
explicitly grant access to criminal trials. [d. at 604. The Court noted, however, that one 
of the purposes of the first amendment was to encourage "free discussion of governmen-
tal affairs" and access to criminal trials ensures that the discussion of these affairs will 
be an informed one. [d. at 605. 
57. [d. at 605. From the time the country's laws were adopted to the present, crimi-
nal trials have been presumptively open to the public. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). In his concurring opinion in Richmond, Justice Brennan 
said that the tradition of access was significant because the "Constitution carries the 
gloss of history" and because a "tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment 
of experience." [d. at 589. , 
58. Globe, 457 U.S. at 606. The Court observed that access to criminal trials was 
particularly significant for a variety of reasons: 
[d. 
Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality 
and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with 
benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole. 
Moreover, public access to the criminal trial fosters an appear-
ance of fairness, thereby heightening public respect for the ju-
dicial process. And in the broadest terms, public access to 
criminal trials permits the public to participate in and serve as 
a check upon the judicial process - an essential component in 
our structure of self-government. In sum, the institutional 
value of the open criminal trial is recognized in both logic and 
experience. 
59. [d. at 607. The state argued that closure was justified in order to protect the 
minor victim from embarrassment and further trauma and to encourage truthful testi-
mony. [d. 
60. [d. at 607. The Court found the Massachusetts statute overly broad. [d. at 609. 
It noted that determination of closure on a case-by-case basis would confine closure to 
those cases where denial of access was absolutely necessary to protect the state's interest. 
[d. 
9
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In Globe, the Court agreed that protecting the minor victim 
from trauma and embarrassment was a compelling interest, how-
ever, the mandatory closure rule was not narrowly tailored.61 
Additionally, the state's interest in encouraging truthful testi-
mony did not warrant a mandatory closure rule.62 For these rea-
sons, the Court held that the Massachusetts statute violated the 
first amendment.6s 
4. Access to Other Criminal Proceedings 
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 
(hereinafter Press-Enterprise l),64 the right of access to criminal 
trials was judicially extended to include voir dire proceedings.611 
In Press-Enterprise I, all but three days of the six-week voir 
dire proceeding were closed to the public and the newspaper's 
request for transcripts of the proceeding was denied.66 The hear-
ings were closed to protect the privacy interests of prospective 
jurors.67 The Court articulated standards to be used by trial 
courts when determining whether a proceeding should be closed 
to the public.68 The Court held that "[a]bsent consideration of 
alternatives to closure,89 the trial court could not constitution-
61. [d. at 608. The Court felt that closure could easily be determined on a case-by-
case basis taking into account such factors as the "minor victim's age, psychological ma-
turity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the 
interests of parents and relatives." [d. 
62. [d. at 609. The state failed to offer any support for its theory that the automatic 
closure rule contained in the Massachusetts statute would encourage truthful testimony. 
[d. The claim was not only speculative but illogical. [d. at 609-10. Even though the press 
and public were barred from the courtroom, they still had access to the trial transcripts 
and other records which would provide them with an account of the victim's testimony. 
[d. 
63. [d. at 610-11. 
64. 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (rape and murder of a teenage girl). 
65. [d. at 503. 
66. [d. at 503. 
67. [d. at 511. 
68. [d. at 510. After it has been determined that the proceeding has a history of 
openJ;less and that openness enhances the judicial proceeding: 
[d. 
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by 
an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essen-
tial to preserve higher values and Is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with find-
ings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine 
whether the closure order was properly entered. 
69. [d. at 511. The Supreme Court noted that the trial involved the alleged rape of a 
10
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ally close the voir dire. "70 
The standards set out in Globe71 and in Press-Enterprise I 
have been applied in subsequent cases to justify access to pre-
liminary hearings,72 post-trial documents,73 and pre-trial release 
documents.7 ' However, first amendment accessibility rights have 
not been recognized in cases where the proceeding has tradition-
ally been closed to the public.711 The first amendment was not 
designed to shed light on information and materials securely 
young girl and, for that reason, some of the questions asked of the jurors may have been 
sensitive in nature. [d. In spite of this, the trial court should have considered alternatives 
to complete closure that would have protected the privacy rights of the potential jurors 
without infringing on the public's right of access to the voir dire proceeding. [d. at 512. 
For instance, the trial judge could have informed the potential jurors of the nature of the 
questions and those individuals who would have been embarrassed by public questioning 
could have requested an opportunity to present the problem to the judge in private. [d. 
70. [d. at 511. 
71. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60. 
72. See Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. I (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Press-Enterprise II]. In Press-Enterprise II, the defendant, a nurse, was accused of 
murdering 12 patients by administering massive doses of cardiac medication. [d. at 3. On 
defendant's motion, the trial court excluded the press and the public from the 41-day 
preliminary hearing and opposed Press-Enterprise's motion to have a transcript of the 
preliminary hearing released. [d. at 5. The trial court concluded there was a "reasonable 
likelihood" that prejudice would result from publication of the transcript. [d. The 
United States Supreme Court held that the first amendment requires more than a rea-
sonable likelihood of prejudice. [d. at 14. There must be a "substantial probability" that 
prejudice will occur and, further, the court must consider whether the interests of the 
accused would be protected by methods other than complete closure. [d. 
73. See CBS, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 765 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1985). In CBS, 
the defendant filed a motion to reduce sentence under convictions of drug and tax eva-
sion charges. The court held that there was no basis for affording greater confidentiality 
to post-trial documents than to pre-trial documents so long as the justification for the 
access was not outweighed by some compelling interest for closure articulated in the 
findings. [d. at 825. 
74. See Seattle Times v. United States Dist. Ct., 845 F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1988). In 
Seattle, the defendant was indicted on five counts of product tampering which resulted 
in two deaths. [d. at 1514. The press demanded access to sealed documents filed in con-
nection with the defendant's pre-trial detention hearing. [d. The court found no history 
of openness to pre-trial detention hearings. [d. at 1516. However, this did not foreclose a 
right of access if openness would playa significant role in the functioning of the proceed-
ing. [d. The trial court's record failed to show that there was a "substantial probability" 
that irreparable damage would result if the documents were not sealed, that alternatives 
to closure would not adequately protect defendant's rights, and that closure would effec-
tively protect defendant's right to a fair trial. [d. at 1517-18. Therefore, the public and 
the press had a qualified right of access to the pre-trial documents. [d. at 1519. 
75. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979) (access to 
grand jury transcripts); Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (pro-
ceedings of commission investigating judicial misconduct). 
11
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within the government's control,76 It is essential that some pro-
ceedings be conducted in secret.77 
Although the press has a right to gather newsworthy infor-
mation,78 this right does not support the proposition that the 
first amendment "compels ... [the] government to supply 
information. "79 
B. COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS TO JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS AND 
RECORDS 
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,80 the media re-
quested access to the "Watergate Tapes" which had been admit-
76. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (broadcast company requested per-
mission to inspect and photograph a portion of the County jail where a suicide occurred). 
In Houchins, Chief Justice Burger stated that "this Court has never intimated a First 
Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within govern-
ment control." [d. at 9. Access to information is assured "once government has opened 
its doors." [d. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Gannett, 443 U.S. at 405. In Jus-
tice Rehnquist's concurring opinion, he stated that "[t)he first amendment was [not) 
some sort of sunshine law that required notice, an opportunity to be heard, and substan-
tial reasons before a governmental proceeding may be closed to the public and press." 
77. See Douglas, 441 U.S. at 223. The secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings 
should not be violated unless the particularized need for disclosure outweighs the contin-
ued need for secrecy. [d. But see United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 630 (3d Cir. 1954). 
Although grand jury proceedings are traditionally conducted in secret, disclosure to de-
fendant of defendant's own testimony would not subvert the inviolability of the grand 
jury proceeding. The Third Circuit summarized the reasons for secrecy in grand jury 
proceedings: 
(I) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may 
be contemplated; 
(2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its 
deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or 
their friends from importuning the grand jurors; 
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with 
the witnesses who may testify before grand jury and later ap-
pear at the trial of those indicted by it; 
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by per-
sons who have information with respect to the commission of 
crimes; 
(5) to protect [an) innocent accused who is exonerated 
from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investiga-
tion, and from the expense of standing trial where there was 
no probability of guilt. 
[d. at 628-29. 
78. See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11. The press has a right to gather news by any lawful 
means and to publish any information which is lawfully obtained without restrictions. [d. 
79. [d. 
80. 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
12
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ted into evidence at the trial of ex-President Nixon's former ad-
visers.81 The Supreme Court recognized a common law right to 
inspect and copy public records and documents, including judi-
cial records and documents.82 However, this right is not abso-
lute.83 "Access [may be] denied where court files might become a 
vehicle for improper purposes."84 The Court observed that, as a 
rule, trial courts have discretionary control over their own files 
and records.8G Without precisely delineating the contours of the 
common law right,8S the Court assumed that it covered the tapes 
at issue.87 The Court noted that it would normally undertake a 
balancing of the competing interests to determine if access 
should be granted or denied.88 However, its need to do so in this 
case was disposed of by the Presidential Recordings and Materi-
als Act.89 The Court held that "the presence of an alternative 
means of public access tips the scales in favor of denying 
release. "90 
81. Id. at 591. The news media wanted to copy the tapes for broadcast and sale to 
the general public. Id. 
82. Id. at 597. The common law right arises even though the individual requesting 
access does not have a "proprietary interest" in the document requested. Id. Access 
rights may be supported by a "desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public 
agencies" or by a "newspaper publisher's intention to publish information concerning the 
operation of government." Id. at 598. 
83. Id. at 598. 
84. Id. The Court defined such improper purposes as the use of records "to gratify 
private spite or promote public scandal." Id. (quoting In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 836, 29 
A. 259, 260 (1893)). It would also be improper to use court records to facilitate the distri-
bution of libelous statements contained in the record, or to distribute business informa-
tion to a litigant's competitor. Id. 
85.Id. 
86. Id. at 599. It was difficult for the Court to "distill" a "comprehensive definition 
of ... the common-law right of access or to identify all the factors to be weighed in 
determining whether access [was) appropriate" from the relatively few decisions that had 
analyzed this common-law right. Id. 
87. Id. at 599. 
88. Id. at 603. In Nixon, the ex-President advanced several reasons for nondisclo-
sure. Id. at 600. He argued that "he [had] a property interest in the sound of his own 
voice ... [which the] respondents [intended] to appropriate unfairly," that his "privacy 
would be infringed if aural copies of the tapes were distributed to the public," and "that 
it would be improper for the courts to facilitate the commercialization of these White 
House tapes." Id. at 600-01. The media urged the Court to allow access because the tapes 
represented all "immensely important historical occurrence" and publication would ad-
vance the public's understanding of the Watergate events. Id. at 602. 
89. Id. at 603. The Act directed the Administrator of General Services to take cus-
tody of all tape recordings involving President Nixon which were recorded during the 
period beginning January 20, 1969 and ending August 9, 1974, to preserve them for his-
torical interest, and to make them accessible to the public. Id. at 603 n.15. 
90. Id. at 606. 
13
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1. Trial Court Discretion 
As recognized in Nixon, the trial court has a certain amount 
of discretion when considering motions requesting access to judi-
cial records and documents.91 This discretion should be "exer-
cised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the par-
ticular case."92 Trial courts must weigh the competing interests 
before deciding whether to grant or deny access.93 Nixon pro-
vided very little guidance on the strength of the presumption in 
favor of the common law right and since that time the lower 
courts have struggled with this question.94 
91. [d. at 599. 
92. [d. See also United States v. Guzzino, 766 F.2d 302, 304 (7th Cir. 1985) (trial 
judge abused discretion when he refused to release two audio tapes introduced into evi-
dence at trial for copying); United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1293 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(trial court did not abuse discretion in denying access to evidence which had been admit-
ted at trial because court considered the possibility that access would probably taint the 
current trial and a future trial), and In re Nat'l Broadcasting Co., Inc., 653 F.2d 609, 613 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (trial court abused discretion in denying application for permission to 
copy audio and video tapes introduced into evidence). 
93. See Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1295. The trial court denied media access to audio 
recording introduced into evidence at trial. [d. at 1290. The court emphasized a strong 
presumption in favor of access but held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when denial was based on the acknowledgment that adverse publicity arising from the 
broadcasting of the tape would make it difficult to empanel a jury in a future trial 
against defendant on tax evasion charges. [d. at 1296. See also United States v. Criden, 
648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981) (television network requested permission to copy video and 
audio tapes admitted into evidence at Abscam trial for purposes of broadcasting the 
tapes to the public). The court in Criden found that a strong common law presumption 
of access buttressed by significant public interest in the Abscam proceedings mandated 
access to the materials and access would not infringe on defendant's right to a fair trial. 
[d. at 829. In granting access, the court was sensitive to information contained in the 
tapes which was injurious to third parties and permitted excise of the tapes before re-
lease to the media. [d. 
94. Compare In re Application of National Broadcasting Co., Inc. (United States v. 
Myers), 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980) (only the most extraordinary circumstances will 
justify restrictions on the common law right of access) with Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 434 (5th Cir. 1981) (common law right of access is merely one of the 
interests to be weighed in the balancing). In Myers, the Second Circuit relied on Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) and Nebraska Press Ass'n v. 
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) to raise the common law right of access to constitutional 
dimensions. Myers, 635 F.2d at 951. The court noted that Richmond emphasized the 
important public interest in knowing what transpires in a courtroom and held that inter-
est would be served by allowing access to any information entered into evidence at trial. 
[d. at 952. 
See also United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (1976) (networks requested copies 
of tape recordings introduced into evidence at trial). In Mitchell, Chief Judge Bazelon 
referred to the first and sixth amendments of the constitution in order to underscore the 
importance of the common law right and the "duty to tread carefully in this important 
14
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In Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dist. Court,9/!> 
the Ninth Circuit considered whether the media had a common 
law right to copy audio and video tapes as they were admitted 
into evidence.96 The Ninth Circuit adopted what it termed a 
"middle-ground stance"97 chosen by three of the circuits that 
had previously ruled on the common law access issue.98 The 
Ninth Circuit found a strong presumption in favor of access.99 
Any denial of access must be supported by articulated facts 
based on more than mere hypothesis or conjecture. lOO 
2. Review of Trial Court's Discretion 
In reviewing cases where the right of access has been re-
area." He wrote: 
This common law right is not some arcane relic of ancient En· 
glish law. To the contrary, the right is fundamental to a demo-
cratic state. As James Madison warned, "A popular Govern-
ment without popular information, or the means of acquiring 
it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy: or perhaps both 
. . . . Like the First Amendment, ... the right of inspection 
serves to produce "an informed and enlightened public opin-
ion." Like the public trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, 
the right serves to "safeguard against any attempt to employ 
our courts as instruments of persecution," to promote the 
search for truth, and to assure "confidence in judicial 
remedies." 
[d. at 1258 (footnotes omitted). 
95. 798 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1986). 
96. [d. at 1290. 
97. [d. at 1293. 
98. See Edwards, 672 F.2d at 1294 (7th Cir. 1982) ("there is a strong presumption in 
support of the common law right to inspect and copy judicial records"); Myers, 653 F.2d 
at 613 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (access may be denied only if, after weighing the competing inter-
est, the court concludes that "justice so requires"); and Criden, 648 F.2d at 823 (3d Cir. 
1981) (strong presumption that material introduced into evidence at trial should be 
accessible). 
99. Valley, 798 F.2d at 1293. Even though the common law right serves to protect 
the same interests protected by the first amendment, the Ninth Circuit did not find that 
the common law right reached constitutional dimensions. [d. 
100. [d. at 1294. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of access for 
abuse of discretion. [d. The record showed that considerations which supported nondis-
closure had been articulated by the trial court. [d. at 1294-95. Specifically, providing 
tapes to the media on a day-to-day basis was administratively inconvenient and em-
paneled jurors might be tainted by trial publicity if they disregarded court instructions 
to avoid exposure. [d. The Ninth Circuit found that the administrative inconvenience 
was not a monumental problem because the media already had a right to publicize the 
contents of the tapes even if copies were not available for transmission, and the possibil-
ity of jury taint was hypothetical and not supported by the record. [d. 
15
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quested by the public, the task of the appellate court is to deter-
mine if the relevant factors were "considered and given the ap-
propriate weight"IOI by the trial court,102 Reasons given for 
denying access must be supported by the record, lOS A trial court 
may deny access if it is sought for an improper purposel04 or if it 
would infringe on a defendant's right to a fair trial. loll Addition-
ally, access may be denied if it would invade the privacy inter-
ests of third partieslo6 or if it would seriously interfere with gov-
101. Criden, 648 F.2d at 819. 
102. See In re Knoxville News Sentinel Co., Inc., 723 F.2d 470, 473-74 (6th Cir. 
1983) (district court's control over its own records and documents does not mean that 
discretionary powers can be exercised without restraint); See also Criden, 648 F.2d at 
818 (when the decision is not based on the particular observations of the trial court but 
on circumstances that are "so new that it is not yet advisable to frame a binding rule of 
law" the scope of review is broad). In Criden, the court observed that substantial defer-
ence is given to trial court decisions based on first-hand knowledge and familiarity with 
the proceedings. [d. "In those circumstances, the trial court has a superior vantage point 
which an appellate court cannot replicate." [d. The court stated that the decision 
whether to grant access to video and audio tapes was not dependent on the observations 
of the trial court. [d. Therefore, the review was not as narrow as in those circumstances 
where the trial court's decision was based on first-hand observations. [d. It was necessary 
for the trial court to articulate the reasons for its decision so that the review will be 
confined to "its appropriate scope - i.e., whether the relevant factors were considered 
and given appropriate weight .... " [d. at 819. 
103. See United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 413 (6th Cir. 1986) ("a mere artic-
ulation of rational justifications will not suffice .... A district court must set forth 
substantial reasons for denying such requests"); Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 
F.2d 1059, 1073 (3d Cir. 1984) (when the district court fails to articulate reasons for 
denying access, the appellate court is left to speculate as to the reasons for closure); 
Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 803-04 (11th Cir. 1983) (district court's decision to 
deny access was reversed "[b]ecause the district court did not articulate any reason for 
excluding the appellants that outweighed the presumption of access to the court pro-
ceedings .... "); Criden, 648 F.2d at 819 (the exercise of discretion must be supported by 
"the trial court's articulation of the factors considered and the weight accorded to 
them"). 
104. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978); United 
States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 825 (3d Cir. 1981) (even where the information has al-
ready been made public at trial, the right to copy may be denied if it is for an improper 
purpose). 
105. See id. at 826. But see United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) ("the risk of causing possible prejudice at a hypothetical second trial [did] not 
justify infringing appellant's right to inspect and copy the tapes"); United States v. Ed-
wards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1982) (the reasons articulated for nondisclosure 
must not be solely supported by hypothesis or conjecture). See also Gannett v. DePas-
quale, 443 U.S. 368, 401 (1979) (press must show and the court must consider alternative 
procedures which would not deprive defendant of a fair trial); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. 
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563 (1976) (before access is denied for possible jury taint, alterna-
tives must be considered). 
106. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (protective order bar-
ring dissemination of information obtained through discovery did not violate first 
amendment); Knoxville, 723 F.2d at 477 (district court did not abuse its discretion when 
16
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ernment's investigation of a crime.lo7 The appellate court must 
also be aware of abuses of discretion which occur when the trial 
court fails to give the opposing party notice and an opportunity 
to be heard. lo8 Abuses are also found when the court's decision is 
based on "erroneous conclusions of law" or when the reasons for 
closure are irrational.109 If exclusion is warranted, the court's or-
der must be narrowly drawn.lIo 
3. Access to Search Warrant Materials 
In a Rhode Island district court opinion, the court observed 
that sealing of documents, such as affidavits filed in support of 
it removed certain exhibits containing the financial records of third parties from the 
court files); Myers, 653 F.2d at 620 (the interest in avoiding injury to third persons was 
properly balanced against the media's interest in access); Criden, 648 F.2d at 829 (por-
tions of a tape containing libelous statements about third parties was properly excised). 
107. See generally United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677 (1958) (tran-
script of grand jury proceedings); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(sealed portion of bill of particulars naming un indicted coconspirators); Offices of Lake-
side Non-Ferrous Metals V. United States, 679 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1982) (search warrant 
affidavits); In re Special Grand Jury (for Anchorage, Alaska), 674 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 
1982) (ministerial records for special grand jury). 
108. See In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 1984) (those opposing 
closure must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on the question of exclu-
sion); Knoxville, 723 F.2d at 474 (district court failed to give "the press a reasonable 
opportunity to state their objections to its protective order"); Criden, 675 F.2d at 557. 
The Third Circuit in Criden set out the parameters of the due process notice: 
[I)dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally 
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the pri-
vate interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved and 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Id. at 557-58 (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976». 
The Third, Ninth and Sixth circuits have extended notice requirements to include 
those instances where requests for disclosure are made in writing or in chambers and not 
in open court. See Knoxville, 723 F.2d at 475 (6th Cir. 1983); Criden, 675 F.2d at 559-60 
(3d Cir. 1982); and United States V. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982) (orders of 
district court closing voir dire, pre-trial suppression hearings and other in camera pro-
ceedings did not satisfy procedural prerequisites). 
109. United States V. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1577 (9th Cir. 1988) (disclosure of a 
criminal presentence report to a third party was appropriate). 
110. See Sacramento Bee V. United States Dist. Ct., 656 F.2d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982) (court's decision to close two short hearings after 
carefully considering alternatives was not error). Id. at 479. 
17
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search warrants, was an extraordinary action. III A search war-
rant affidavit becomes a public record on filing with the court.ll2 
However, denial of access may be necessary in order to serve the 
ends of justice.113 Any order prohibiting disclosure must be nar-
rowly tailored and for "good cause" and the courts must balance 
the right of access against a party's interest in privacy. 114 
In Matter of Sealed Affidavit(s) to Search Warrants,11II the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order allowing access 
to search warrant affidavits.116 Relying on Nixon,117 the Ninth 
Circuit found that courts have inherent power to control their 
own documents and ~records "within certain constitutional and 
other limitations. "118 The Ninth Circuit held that the district 
court "improperly concluded that federal courts per se lacked 
the authority to seal affidavits."1l9 Conversely, in In re Search 
Warrant for Secretarial Area-Gunn [hereinafter McDonnell 
Douglas],120 the Eighth Circuit held that a qualified first amend-
ment right of access extended to documents filed in support of 
search warrants.l2l In McDonnell Douglas, Pulitzer Publishing 
Company requested access to pre-indictment search warrant 
materials filed in connection with the FBI's Operation Ill-Wind 
111. In re Search Warrant for Second Floor Bedroom, 489 F. Supp. 207 (D. R.I. 
1980) (in view of the fact that government failed to demonstrate any real harm from 
disclosure, the newspaper's motion to unseal affidavits filed in support of search warrant 
applications should be granted). 
112. Newspapers of New England v. Clerk-Mag., 531 N.E.2d 1261, 1263 (Mass. 
1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 2064 (1989) (no constitutional right of access to search 
warrant affidavit even though the affidavit was a public record because good cause ex-
isted for sealing the record prior to the defendant's indictment). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. See also Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979). 
"The court's duty ... is to weigh carefully the competing interests in light of the rele-
vant circumstances and the standards announced by this Court. And if disclosure is or-
dered, the court may include protective limitations on the use of the disclosed material 
.... " Id. at 223. 
115. 600 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979) (alleged violations of federal law in management 
and control of Tropicana Hotel). 
116. Id. at 1257. The district court unsealed the affidavits because "federal courts 
have no power to seal affidavits upon which search warrants are based." Id. 
117. 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
118. Matter of Sealed Affidauit(s) to Search Warrants, 600 F.2d at 1257. 
119. Id. at 1258. 
120. 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 793 (1989) (investigation 
into alleged bribery in defense industry). 
121. Id. at 573. 
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investigation in the Eighth Circuit.122 The court observed that 
there was a first amendment right of access to search warrant 
materials because they were not routinely filed under seal and 
because access would positively aid in the public's understand-
ing of the judicial process and prevent judicial misconduct or 
abuse.123 However, this recognition of first amendment rights did 
not support immediate disclosure. l24 The court found that re-
lease of the documents would seriously jeopardize the govern-
ment's ongoing criminal investigation.121i For that reason, and 
because the order was narrowly defined,126 closure was 
acceptable.127 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Petitioners, Times Mirror Company, The Copley Press, Inc. 
and Channel 39, KCST -TV [hereinafter "the media"], argued 
that the first amendment granted access to criminal proceedings 
and related documents and that search warrant proceedings 
were, by definition, criminal proceedings.128 Additionally, the 
media asserted that openness would enhance the fact-finding 
process and lead to a "better-informed public."129 The court re-
jected the media's argument and noted that public access would 
"undermine important values that are served by keeping some 
122. Times, 873 F.2d at 1217. 
123. McDonnell Douglas, 855 F.2d at 573. The court also observed that search war-
rant materials were often the subject of suppression hearings and should be treated no 
differently from suppression hearings which were traditionally open to the public. [d. 
Additionally, the court found that the search warrant, like the criminal trial, is an inte-
gral part of the criminal justice system and, therefore, subject to first amendment rights. 
[d. 
124. [d. at 574. Documents may be sealed if there are compelling reasons for closure 
and the closure order is narrowly tailored. 
125. [d. at 574. The affidavits contained information obtained as a result of govern-
mental wire-taps or from confidential informants which, if disclosed, would compromise 
the government's criminal investigation. [d. 
126. [d. at 574. Because the affidavits were extensive and, for the most part, dupli-
cative, any line-by-line redaction of the confidential portions of the documents would be 
impracticable. [d. 
127. McDonnell Douglas, 855 F.2d at 575. 
128. [d. at 1212. The petitioners conceded that the first amendment rights were not 
absolute. [d. at 1211 n.l. Access may be denied if there is a compelling governmental 
interest necessitating closure and the order is "narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 
[d. 
129. [d. at 1213. 
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proceedings closed to the public.m80 The court observed that 
public access to a particular proceeding has never been granted 
"without first establishing that the benefits of opening the pro-
ceeding outweigh the costs to the public. "181 This balancing test 
required the court to establish whether first amendment rights 
were implicated by initially examining 1) whether the proceed-
ing had historically been open to the public and 2) whether 
openness would positively contribute to the functioning of the 
proceeding.182 
Applying the first part of the two-part analysis, the Ninth 
Circuit found no historical tradition of public access to warrant 
proceedings.188 The court acknowledged that search warrant affi-
davits and related materials become part of the public record 
after the search warrant is served.18' However, this did not un-
dermine the government's argument that there was "no history 
of unrestricted access to warrant materials. "1811 
130. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that the criminal investigation process would be 
jeopardized by allowing access to certain documents or procedures such as grand jury 
investigations which are traditionally held in secret. Id. 
131. Id. See also Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986). 
132. Times, 873 F.2d at 1213. This two-part analysis has been applied to cases in-
volving access to judicial proceedings. See Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8 (preliminary 
hearing); Press Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 505-10 (voir dire examination); Globe Newspa-
pers, 457 U.S. at 605 (criminal trial); and Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (crimi-
nal trial) (Brennan, J., concurring). However, it also may be applied "to documents gen-
erated as part of a judicial proceeding." Times, 873 F.2d at 1213 n.4. See also Seattle 
Times, 845 F.2d at 1515-16 (pre-trial release documents); Brooklier, 685 F.2d at 1172 
(transcripts of three closed hearings). 
133. Id. at 1213. In fact, the opposite is true. Id. at 1214. Most warrants are issued 
by a judge or magistrate on the basis of an ex parte application made by a government 
official. Id. These ex parte proceedings are held privately in a judge's chambers. Id. See 
also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1977) (defendant had a constitutional right to 
challenge the veracity of statements filed in support of search warrant). Although recog-
nizing the right to challenge the statements ~ade in a search warrant affidavit, the court 
found that it would be impossible for defendant to challenge these statements before the 
warrant was executed because the "pre search proceeding is necessarily ex parte since 
the subject of the search cannot be tipped off to the application for a warrant lest he 
destroy or remove evidence." Id. at 169. See also United States v. United States Dist. 
Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (government's warrantless surveillance violated fourth amend-
ment). In that case, the court recognized the importance of conducting investigations in 
secret but found that warrant proceedings posed no threat to secrecy because such pro-
ceedings were not "public". Id. at 321. 
134. Times, 873 F.2d at 1214. 
135. Id. The government may apply for an order restricting access to the search 
warrant materials. Id. These requests are routinely granted during an on-going criminal 
investigation on a showing that confidentiality is necessary. Id. 
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Next, the court considered whether public access would play 
a "significant positive role in the functioning of the proceed-
ing. "136 The court conceded that the media's arguments in favor 
of public access were "clearly legitimate."137 Nevertheless, the 
court found that public access would severely hinder the govern-
ment's ability to conduct criminal investigations.138 Public ac-
cess would alert those named in the search warrants to the fact 
that they were under investigation139 and would infringe on an 
innocent individual's privacy rights.Ho 
136. [d. at 1214-15. 
137. Id. at 1215. The media set forth three arguments in support of their position 
for openness of the warrant proceedings: First, open warrant proceedings are essential to 
self-government because observation of all aspects of the judicial process promotes open 
discussion of the process and serves as a check on possible governmental abuses. Id. 
Second, public scrutiny of warrant proceedings enhances the "quality and safeguards the 
integrity of the fact-finding process," as is true with public scrutiny of the criminal trial. 
Id. Third, open warrant proceedings and access to warrant materials would have the 
same "community therapeutic value" as open criminal trials, by serving as an outlet for 
the sense of outrage, insecurity and need for retribution that a community feels when a 
crime occurs. [d. 
In Times Mirror's Petition for Rehearing, it noted that the issues raised in support 
of openness were of tremendous public importance-"Operation Ill-Wind" involves alle-
gations of wrongdoing at the highest levels of our government, which directly affect the 
core of our system of democractic self-government - how our government is being con-
ducted, how our tax dollars are being spent and how our military defense systems are 
procured." Times Mirror v. United States, United States Court of Appeals, Nos. 88-6278, 
88-6279, 88-6280 and 88-7291. 
138. [d. The Ninth Circuit found the warrant proceedings "indistinguishable" from 
grand jury proceedings. [d. If grand jury proceedings were held openly the criminal in-
vestigation process would be frustrated. [d. Secrecy is no less important when the gov-
ernment is developing evidence to present to the grand jury. [d. 
If proceedings before and related to evidence presented to a 
grand jury (including subpoenas, documents and even hear-
ings before the court for the immunization of witnesses) can 
be kept secret, a fortiori, matters relating to a criminal inves-
tigation leading to the development of evidence to be 
presented to a grand jury may also be kept secret. Indeed, 
search warrant proceedings are one step back from the con-
vening of a grand jury. 
[d. at 1215-16. (quoting Judge Harvey, Re Sealed Search Warrants and Affidavits, Crimi-
nal No. H-88-0427, oral opinion at 12-13 (D. Md. August 30, 1988». 
139. Times, 873 F.2d at 1215. If search warrant proceedings were open, those named 
in the search warrant might destroy vital evidence before the search warrant could be 
executed, flee the district, or attempt to coordinate stories with alleged co-conspirators. 
[d. 
140. [d. at 1216. The Ninth Circuit noted that individuals named in search warrants 
were often proved innocent after further investigation. [d. Further, if the warrant mater-
ials were made public, innocent parties would have no forum in which to exonerate 
themselves. [d. 
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As there was no history of openness to search warrant pro-
ceedings or documentsa1 or any justification for openness that 
would outweigh the burden to the government,142 The court held 
that there was no first amendment right of access to search war-
rant proceedings or search warrant materials during an ongoing 
criminal investigation prior to indictment.143 
B. THE COMMON LAW 
The media alternatively claimed it had a common law right 
of access144 to the search warrant materials even if the first 
amendment did not secure such a right.1411 The Ninth Circuit 
noted that in two previous Ninth Circuit cases the court had 
considered the issue and had declined to find a common law 
right.146 The court applied the same two tests for the common 
law right as for first amendment rights and held that absent a 
tradition of openness or any important public need justifying ac-
cess there was no common law right of access to pre-indictment 
search warrant materials.147 Therefore, the media's claim was 
141. [d. at 1218. 
142. [d. at 1218. The court acknowledged that some positive benefits would flow 
from a right of access to search warrant materials. [d. For instance, the public would be 
better informed about the inner workings of government and publication would prevent 
governmental abuses in the warrant process. [d. However, these benefits would be mini-
mal compared with the government's need for secrecy at the pre-indictment stage of its 
investigation. [d. 
143. [d. The court acknowledged that the Eighth Circuit had taken an opposing 
position on the right of access to search warrant materials. See supra notes 120-127 and 
accompanying text. In Times, the Ninth Circuit disapproved of the court's reasoning in 
McDonnell Douglas. [d. at 1217. First, the fact that the warrant materials are not rou-
tinely filed under seal merely describes the normal practices of the court where the gov-
ernment believes that secrecy is unnecessary. [d. It does not establish any first amend-
ment guarantee that warrant materials be filed without seal. [d. Second, "[t)he warrant 
process ... which would be jeopardized if warrant proceedings were conducted openly 
would be equally threatened if the information disclosed during the proceeding were 
open to public scrutiny .... " [d. (emphasis in original). Third, access to search warrant 
information is not mandated by the first amendment simply because the warrant materi-
als may become the subject of a suppression hearing at some later point. [d. at 1217-18. 
144. Times, 873 F.2d at 1218. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 
589 (1978). 
145. Times, 873 F.2d at 1218. 
146. See In Re Special Grand Jury (For Anchorage, Alaska) 674 F.2d 778, 781 (9th 
Cir. 1982). (Members of the public have a right of access to files and records of the 
district court having jurisdiction of the grand jury, subject to the rules of grand jury 
secrecy). See also Associated Press v. United States Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (common law right of access does not extend to all pretrial documents). 
147. Times, 873 F.2d at 1219. But see United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574 (9th 
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rejected. 148 
C. FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SECTION 41(G) 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the media 
was entitled to access under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
41(g).149 The media argued that because the Rule required war-
rant materials and accompanying affidavits to be filed with the 
clerk of the court, the documents were rendered "judicial 
records to which a presumption of openness attache[d]."lGO The 
Ninth Circuit found that Gongress adopted Rule 41(g) with no 
intention of expanding first amendment or common law 
rights.m The court held that Rule 41(g) did not create new ac-
cess rightsU2 or expand the public's right of access beyond that 
previously secured by the first amendment or the common 
law.1G3 The court found that the rule merely provided for the 
proper procedural transfer of warrant materials to the clerk of 
the court for filing. 1G4 
Cir. 1981). In Schlette, the court found a common law right of access to presentence 
reports which are traditionally kept confidential because the party requesting access was 
able to show that disclosure would serve the ends of justice. [d. at 1581. 
148. Times, 873 F.2d at 1219. 
149. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) provides: "The federal magistrate before whom the war-
rant is returned shall attach to the warrant a copy of the return, inventory and all other 
papers in connection therewith and shall file them with the clerk of the district court for 
the district in which the property was seized." 
150. [d. at 1219. The media relied on In re Search Warrant for Second Floor Bed-
room, 489 F. Supp. 207 (D. R.I. 1980) to support its claim. In Second Floor Bedroom, the 
court held that although Rule 41(g) was designed to aid the defendant in gaining access 
to search warrant materials, "there was every reason to suppose that the Rule was 
adopted to llenefit the public as well." [d. at 208 n.1. The Ninth Circuit declined to 
accept the implication of Second Floor Bedroom that public access rights to search war-
rant materials existed "where none existed under either the First Amendment or the 
common law." Times, 873 F.2d at 1220. 
151. [d. at 1220. The court found that unlike FED. R. CRIM. P. 6, the complex disclos-
ure statute enacted to guide a trial court in situations where parties are entitled to access 
grand jury materials, Rule 41(g), on its face, does nothing more than provide for the 
filing of papers with the court. [d. The court felt that if Congress had intended some-
thing more, they would have drafted provisions creating access rights to warrant materi-
als similar to those in Rule 6. [d. 
152. [d. at 1221. 
153. [d. 
154. Id. 
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V. CRITIQUE 
In Times,t&l the Ninth Circuit attempted for the first time 
to define the constitutional limits within which courts could ex-
ercise their power to seal search warrants and related documents 
and records. lIle The Ninth Circuit began its first amendment 
analysis by applying the two-part inquiry set forth by the Su-
preme Court in Globe157 to determine if a first amendment right 
of access was implicated.1l1e The court concluded that these 
"considerations of experience and logic"1119 did not cut in favor 
of a first amendment right of access to pre-indictment search 
warrant materials. leo 
The Ninth Circuit's first amendment analysis is confusing. 
Other courts have found an historical tradition of access to 
search warrant materials1e1 and in Times, the Ninth Circuit ac-
knowledged that there was a general availability to search war-
rant materials once they were filed with the clerk of the court.1e2 
Nevertheless, the court found no tradition of access to these 
materials. The court based this finding on the government's abil-
ity to restrict access to warrant materials in order to maintain 
secrecy during a criminal investigation. Therefore, the court con-
cluded there was no history of unrestricted access to these docu-
ments.1e8 This argument is not persuasive. The government has 
always been able to restrict access to any proceeding, even a 
criminal trial, if the need to do so was sufficiently compelling.1e. 
Further, neither of the two cases cited by the court in support of 
the denial of access dealt with the subject of search warrant 
materials. 1611 
155. 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied. 
156. [d. at 1213 n.3. 
157. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
158. Times, 873 F.2d at 1213. 
159. [d. 
160. [d. 
161. See supra notes 111 and 121 and accompanying text. 
162. Times, 873 F.2d at 1214. 
163. [d. 
164. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
165. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1977) and United States v. Unites States 
Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972); see supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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Applying the second part of the two-part Globe analysis,188 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the government's compelling 
need to maintain secrecy during an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion outweighed any significant positive role served by allowing 
access.187 The court has undertaken a balancing of the compet-
ing interests - the media's right of access and the government's 
need for closure - before acknowledging that any first amend- . 
ment rights existed. In Press-Enterprise [,t88 the Court articu-
lated the standards for determining whether a proceeding should 
be closed to the public.189 Only after the court finds a presump-
tion of openness to the proceeding based on first amendment 
considerations should the court weigh the competing interests to 
determine if the procedure should be closed to the public.170 If 
no first amendment rights are implicated, as the court in Times 
held, then no balancing test is required and no discussion of a 
compelling governmental need is necessary. 
Richmond,l7l Globe, Press-Enterprise jI72 and their 
progency have set the standards for first amendment analysis in 
right of access cases. Following these guidelines, the Eighth Cir-
cuit in McDonnell Douglas173 found a qualified first amendment 
right of access to documents filed in support of search war-
rants.174 The court based its finding on historical tradition and 
public importance. l7II Yet in Times, the Ninth Circuit specifi-
cally rejected the Eighth Circuit's reasoning supporting the im-
plications of first amendment rights178 and created a hybrid ap-
proach to first amendment analysis. In the end,. both the Ninth 
Circuit and the Eighth Circuit denied the media's request for 
access to search warrant materials. However, each court's analy-
sis was significantly different, a factor that may create confusion 
in later cases involving first amendment access rights. 
166. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
167. Times, 873 F.2d at 1215. 
168. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
169. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
170. See supra notes 59 and 125 and accompanying text. 
171. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
172. 464 U.S. 502 (1984). 
173. 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 793 (1989). 
174. [d. at 573. 
175. See supra notes 120-127 and accompany text. 
176. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Times decision effectively forecloses any claim of a first 
amendment right of access to pre-indictment search warrant 
materials during an on-going criminal investigation. It remains 
to be seen whether the Ninth Circuit will recognize a common 
law right of access to these documents once a criminal investiga-
tion is completed or after indictments have been handed down. 
Patricia L. Connolly * 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1990 
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